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BOND  V.  UNITED  STATES  AND  INFORMATION-
FORCING  DEFAULTS:  THE  WORK  THAT
PRESUMPTIONS  DO
Paul B. Stephan*
Bond v. United States1 introduces a new presumption to the art of judicial
interpretation of federal statutes.  A court must presume that Congress did
not intend for legislation implementing a treaty to regulate traditional areas
of state authority in a manner that upsets the balance between federal and
state power.2  The presumption puts the burden on Congress to indicate a
contrary intention.  Forcing Congress to resolve a contestable issue raises the
cost of enacting laws that express the presumed-against choice.  The pre-
sumption thus makes it harder to adopt legislation that invades the tradi-
tional domains of state authority, even in pursuit of international law
enforcement.
The case involved Carol Anne Bond’s conviction for knowing use of a
chemical weapon in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1998.3  Bond had coated a mailbox used by a romantic rival
with toxic chemicals in hopes of injuring her.  Local authorities declined to
prosecute under state law, but federal prosecutors charged her with violation
© 2015 Paul B. Stephan.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor and David H. Ibbeken ’71 Research
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.  I am grateful to Curt Bradley and Bill
Dodge for comments and criticism.  Responsibility for all defects is mine alone.
1 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
2 Id. at 2093–94.
3 See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6701–6771 (2012).  The statute generally implements Article VII(1) of the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974
U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997), which requires that state parties, “in
accordance with [their] constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to imple-
ment [their] obligations under th[e] Convention.” Id. at 331.  Bond also pled guilty to
mail tampering, a less serious charge that presented no constitutional difficulties.  The
chemical weapons charge, however, was necessary to sustain under federal law the lengthy
prison sentence that she received. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085–86.
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of the Act.4  The lower courts rejected Bond’s argument that the Act, as
applied to her conduct, exceeded the enumerated powers of Congress under
the Constitution and thus violated the Tenth Amendment.5  The Court over-
turned her conviction, not on the ground that the Act violated the Constitu-
tion but instead because it should not be interpreted as reaching her
conduct.  “[W]e can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach
purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a
way that intrudes on the police power of the States.”6
Over the last few decades, the Court has used a number of interpretative
mechanisms that have the same structure as the Bond presumption.  The pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, the presumption against violating inter-
national law, the presumption against testing constitutional limits, and the
presumption against implied causes of action all have the effect of truncating
the reach of statutes.  This truncation leaves courts in a significant range of
cases lacking either subject matter jurisdiction or a federal rule of decision to
apply to the dispute.  What these presumptions do is demand that Congress,
at a cost, disclose more information about its preferences regarding federal
judicial intervention in the status quo.  A consequence is that, absent such
disclosure, a possibly unwanted status quo will endure. Bond thus reflects a
general trend in the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation, rather than
standing as an isolated instance of rumination about the effect of treaties on
congressional power.
What should we make of this trend?  The legal academy offers many
perspectives, including doctrinal analysis, constitutional theory, historical
analysis, and political theory.  One possibility, rare but not unheard of in the
field of foreign relations law, is to turn to contract theory.7  Contracts
represent a profound mechanism for enabling cooperation through self-gov-
ernance.  Many contractual disputes turn on interpretation.  What contract
theorists think about the use of presumptions in contractual interpretation
can inform how we approach presumptions in statutory interpretation.
Presumptions that force relevant actors to disclose information about
their preferences are well known to contract theorists.  Interpretative defaults
pervade contract law, with a rich literature considering optimal defaults.
Most lawyers will recall Hadley v. Baxendale,8 which obligated a shipper to
reveal additional information as a condition to obtaining coverage for conse-
4 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
5 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2012).  The lower court relied on
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), for the proposition that “if a treaty is valid, ‘there
can be no dispute about the validity of the statute [implementing it] under Article 1, [Sec-
tion] 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.’”
Bond, 681 F.3d at 152 (second alteration added) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at
432).
6 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
7 See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN (2006);
Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in International
Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17 (2014).
8 94 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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quential, as opposed to out-of-pocket, damages.  By refusing to award the
victim of a breach compensation for the full extent of injuries absent an
explicit agreement, the precedent puts the burden on shippers to disclose
information not known to the carrier that, if shared, would extend the range
of and improve the value of the contract.9  Although no consensus exists
about whether Hadley made the right choice between shippers and carriers,
most scholars who draw on the insights of economics would agree that courts
should employ information-forcing defaults to optimize the disclosure of
information between the parties, given the value of the information con-
cerned, the cost of disclosure to the party holding the information, and the
cost of enforcing the default in the absence of disclosure.
This general principle—use information-forcing defaults to optimize the
value of disclosure between the relevant parties—can guide our thinking
about the statutory interpretive presumptions that the Court increasingly has
embraced and extended.  Do the presumptions choose the right instances in
which the value of eliciting an express decision from Congress exceeds the
cost of nonintervention in the status quo?  How do we assess the value of
express congressional decisions?  In what ways is judicial nonintervention
costly?
Contracts and legislation, of course, are more different than alike, even
if they both raise interpretive issues and employ information-forcing defaults.
What makes a good contract, from society’s perspective, is not the same as
what makes good legislation.  But we can take the differences into account
without discarding the basic analysis.  To consider the desirability of the
Court’s recent trend, we need to determine what further deliberation and
decision by Congress would accomplish, and how judicial nonintervention
affects society.  The answers to these questions may not be as clear or as quan-
tifiable as in the case of private gains and costs, but they remain the right
questions to ask.
This Article first places Bond in the context of the Supreme Court’s
growing reliance on interpretive presumptions to limit the effect of legisla-
tion.  While some of the presumptions go back to the early days of the
Republic, the current Court has expanded the roster of these devices and
strengthened their effect. Bond is both the newest such presumption and,
compared with the others, potentially the most far-reaching.  Yet the case did
not cry out for such a move.  But for the Court’s robust use of structurally
similar presumptions in recent years, one might doubt whether it would have
taken this path to decide the case.
A review of the treatment of information-forcing defaults in contracts
scholarship follows.  Contract theory, or more precisely the strand of contract
theory that draws on economics, seeks to identify socially optimal rules for
contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement.  It first explores what
rules optimize the value of a contract for the parties, and then looks for
externalities that may drive a wedge between the parties’ interests and those
9 Id. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 150.
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of society.  A consensus has converged on the propositions that: (a) under
certain conditions, rules that induce one party to disclose private information
can enhance contractual value, and (b) parties seeking to get the most out of
their relationship should prefer such rules regardless of which party bears
the burden of the presumption.  Another, more controversial claim is that a
narrower class of presumptions, called penal defaults, can reduce the nega-
tive externalities of certain contracts by forcing contracting parties to disclose
information to the benefit of society, but not to their own advantage.
To clarify the specific role of these rules, this Article compares informa-
tion-forcing defaults to contract rules that allow parties to design mecha-
nisms to deal with future contingencies about which no party has special
knowledge.  Delegation rules allow parties to specify a set of contingencies
that, upon realization, entitle a selected third party to supplement the con-
tract to incorporate post-contractual information.  From a welfare perspec-
tive, information-forcing defaults and delegations are complements, each
desirable under specified conditions.  But, as to any particular issue, these
strategies operate at cross purposes.  Choosing a delegate to resolve down-
stream problems reduces a party’s incentive to disclose relevant information
at the time of contracting.  The challenge thus becomes determining the
conditions, both in theory and in practice, where each approach is likely to
optimize the value of a contract.
After exploring the economic analysis of contract interpretation, this
Article then considers how contract theory’s insights, which illuminate the
welfare effects of private ordering, might inform our understanding of the
production of public law through the dynamic relationship between legisla-
tors and judges.  A transposition of the private law analysis to public law pro-
duction requires one to have some theory about how the production of
public law works and what benefits and costs it generates.  This Article looks
at several informal models of how Congress and the federal judiciary operate,
and in particular at how they interact with respect to statutory interpretation.
It then identifies the circumstances under each model that would support a
conclusion that the Court’s current trend may contribute to the social good.
The result is a limited defense of the Court’s recent practice in general
and the Bond decision in particular. The rule announced in Bond, like the
presumptions against extraterritoriality, violating international law, and test-
ing constitutional limits, represents a plausible prediction of what Congress
prefers.  An approach to legislative interpretation informed by contract the-
ory would regard this as a majoritarian default that most likely enhances,
rather than impairs, democratic republican decisionmaking.
I. PRESUMPTIONS AND THE COURT
Many specialists in foreign relations law anticipated a significant consti-
tutional decision in Bond.  The Court had intervened in the dispute once
before, requiring the Third Circuit to address the petitioner’s constitutional
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arguments rather than dismissing the claim on standing grounds.10  The
scholarly community hoped for judicial resolution of a debate over the ongo-
ing validity of Missouri v. Holland11 that had riven its ranks.12  The issue, in its
essence, was whether the subject matter limits that Article I of the Constitu-
tion imposes on Congress in deference to the reserved powers of the states
apply to legislation enacted to fulfill a treaty obligation.  What we got instead
was an opinion deciding only that the question of whether Congress through
treaty enforcement could regulate in a manner that encroaches on core state
functions is problematic, and that this justifies interpreting an otherwise
ambiguous statute as not authorizing the exercise of such power.13  Three
Justices offered their views on the constitutional issue, but the others kept
silent.  A decision that might have roared like a lion instead squeaked like a
mouse.
All the same, the new presumption may end up doing some significant
work.  The Bond presumption, functioning something like a reverse preemp-
tion doctrine, does not decide whether a federal enactment divests state reg-
ulation, but instead divests federal regulation in the face of state authority.14
Prior decisions of the modern Court policed constitutional federalism by
invalidating federal legislation that exceeded the Commerce Clause powers
of Congress, although none had treaty implications.15  The Bond presump-
tion, by contrast, is not necessarily tied to treaty enforcement and applies
10 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367 (2011).
11 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
12 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.
390 (1998); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000).  A generation
earlier, this debate seemed unimaginable, as a broad consensus supported the antifederal-
ism interpretation of Missouri v. Holland. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 302 cmt. d (1987).
13 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014).
14 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (preempting a state law that
conflicted with federal policy); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)
(preempting a state law that conflicted with federal law); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968) (preempting a state law that interfered with the field of federal foreign relations
law); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (preempting a state law that conflicted
with an executive agreement with a foreign state); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77
(1941) (authorizing application of state law to high seas “with respect to matters in which
the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress”).
Preemption doctrine functions much like information-forcing presumptions, inasmuch as
Congress has the power to reverse the Court’s outcome.  Perhaps the best established
example of reverse preemption in federal statutory interpretation is the Parker doctrine in
federal antitrust law.  This judicial gloss allows state regulation to oust the application of
federal competition law.  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see Milton Handler, The
Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–8 (1976)
(reviewing doctrine).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012)
(majority opinion); id. at 2643–47 (joint dissent).
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even in the absence of a breach of the constitutional line between federal
and state power.  It is triggered by regulation, not necessarily only in the form
of a criminal statute, that “intrudes on the police power of the States.”16  If
invoked expansively, the presumption might impose a barrier, admittedly
superable, to all federal legislation that interferes with traditional areas of
state regulation.
Why the Court chose this path invites speculation.  The government had
refused to argue that the case on its facts sufficiently involved interstate com-
merce to come within the Commerce Clause.17  The Court, however, did not
have to hold the government to this choice.  It might have determined, for
example, that the statute was valid as applied to Bond, even if other applica-
tions might present constitutional issues.18  This approach would have
allowed the Court to avoid revisiting the constitutional question that Missouri
v. Holland seemed to have answered nearly a century ago while dispensing
with the need to create a new statutory interpretive presumption.
Alternatively, the Court could have reached the constitutional question.
At least three Justices were eager to find constitutional limits on federal legis-
lation designed to implement a treaty.19  It is not unimaginable that in a case
with greater consequences and cleaner facts, two other members of the pre-
sent Court might have joined them in overruling, or at least restricting, Mis-
souri v. Holland.  Why did the Court instead invent a new presumption that, as
they say in government work, kicks the can down the road, putting the bur-
den on Congress to set up a constitutional confrontation?
My guess is that a majority of the Court, and in particular Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, wished to pick and choose its constitutional
battles, and had no great appetite for this one.  It has identified issues about
which it has some intuition as to its preferences, but unaccompanied by a
conviction that a definitive and entrenched resolution of the dispute clearly
will benefit society.  In such cases the majority has invoked a presumption
16 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
17 Id. at 2087.
18 Bond also pled guilty to mail tampering, a charge that the Court characterized as
“natural[ ].” Id. at 2085.  The existence of Article I jurisdiction over this charge might
have sufficed to sustain the existence of Congress’s competence to apply the Act on these
facts.  The government, to be sure, had disclaimed the Commerce Clause argument. Id. at
2086–87.  Justice Scalia, concurring only in the result, described the government as having
“waived” this ground for defending the statute. Id. at 2098 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).  The “waiver” label, however, is not conclusive.  Although the Court may
accede to the government’s choice, it is not bound by it and instead remains free to decide
a case on any ground it regards as appropriate.
19 Justice Scalia argued that Congress could rely only on its Article I powers when
implementing a non-self-executing treaty. Id. at 2098–102.  Justice Thomas, while agreeing
with Justice Scalia, also maintained that the Article II treaty power contains constitutional
limits, although the Chemical Weapons Convention does not test them. Id. at 2110–11
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Alito, while agreeing with Justice
Thomas, would have ruled that the Chemical Weapons Convention exceeds constitutional
limits to the extent that it purported to authorize the adoption of federal legislation regu-
lating Bond’s conduct. Id. at 2011 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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that pushes outcomes in a direction that it finds congenial, but leaves the
door open for Congress to intervene.  Other Justices may have joined in
because the other alternatives on offer may have been even less attractive to
them.
An obvious instance of this behavior is the previous term’s decision in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.20  That case involved the scope of the so-
called Alien Tort Statute, a matter of great interest to human rights advocates
and foreign relations law experts but lacking the broad public interest and
political salience of matters such as LGBT rights, campaign finance reform,
and religious exemptions to federal legislation.21  By the time the decision
came down, Kiobel had become something of a muddle.  The Court originally
had taken the case to decide a rather narrow question and then, after a
round of briefing and argument, discovered that it raised a broader issue and
ordered reargument.22  The result was a rather cryptic invocation of yet
another statutory interpretive presumption, namely that Congress should be
presumed not to give an enactment extraterritorial effect.23
20 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  For more on this decision and its implications, see Roger P.
Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749
(2014); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609 (2014); Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts
Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014); Wil-
liam R. Casto, The ATS Cause Action Is Sui Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1545 (2014);
William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1577
(2014); Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with Inter-
national Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671 (2014); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining
Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” The United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695 (2014); Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort
Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467 (2014); Carlos M. Va´zquez, Things We Do with Presump-
tions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719 (2014).
21 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (concerning relig-
ious exemptions to federal legislation); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(regarding LGBT rights); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (concerning cam-
paign finance reform).
22 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012) (mem.).  Origi-
nally the Court had granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict over the amenability of
corporations to ATS suits, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (2013), an issue that its decision left
unresolved.
23 To be precise, the presumption applies to a statute’s mandate, not to all aspects of a
transaction.  Thus the presence of domestic elements in a dispute does not take it out of
the presumption, if those elements do not engage the statutory rule. See Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (noting that the focus of Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act is the sale of securities, not fighting fraud in all its forms, so
the presence of fraudulent conduct in the United States did not bring the case within the
Act when all sales occurred outside the United States).  Another complicating wrinkle in
Kiobel was that the rule of decision at issue did not come out of any substantive statute, but
rather the federal common law deemed to be generated by a jurisdictional statute. See
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–69.  Although the presumption does not apply to the question of
a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, Kiobel tells us that it does apply to the scope of
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This presumption against extraterritoriality has ancient roots in the
Court’s jurisprudence, but the modern version has played a significant role
only in the last quarter century.24  At the time of Kiobel, the doctrine had
come to the forefront of the Court’s jurisprudence. Morrison v. National Aus-
tralia Bank Ltd.,25 decided three years previously, may have had special sali-
ence for Roberts and Kennedy. Morrison endorsed the presumption
forcefully and categorically, overturning significant and prestigious lower
court jurisprudence as it did so.26 Morrison and Kiobel, in tandem, may have
impressed on Roberts and Kennedy the value of presumptions generally, and
induced them in Bond to trot out a similar device to dispose of the case.
This conjecture raises another question, however.  A different and better
established statutory interpretive presumption holds that Congress does not
intend to force the Court to decide difficult constitutional questions.  In
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Court invoked this doctrine as the basis
for restricting the application of federal labor law to a religious organiza-
tion.27  The presumption resolved a problem of statutory silence while avoid-
ing apparently difficult Free Exercise and Establishment Clause questions.
Although a modern restatement of the law rather than a break with the past,
Catholic Bishop has done considerable work in the ensuing years.28
the prescriptive rule that a court can enforce, whether such a rule is expressed explicitly in
a statute or instead implied.
24 One can trace the presumption back to United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
144, 152 (1820).  Between Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), and EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), however, the Court did not invoke
the presumption, creating the suspicion that it had fallen into desuetude.  The Third
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, for example, did not acknowledge this doctrine.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 rptr. note 2 (discussing
presumption of reasonableness as mechanism for regulating extraterritorial scope of
statutes).
25 561 U.S. 247.
26 Id. at 255.
27 440 U.S. 490 (1979).  Oddly, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion cited Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), as support for the announced presump-
tion. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 500.  In doing so it mischaracterized the earlier
decision. Id. (describing Charming Betsy as “holding that an Act of Congress ought not be
construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available”).
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Charming Betsy did not refer to the Constitution in its
discussion of the decision’s presumption or otherwise equate constitutional and interna-
tional law.
28 According to a Westlaw search, the Court has relied on the Catholic Bishop presump-
tion eleven times to limit the scope of a federal statute. See Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 406 n.40 (2010); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S 371, 381 (2005); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 192 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 n.12 (2001); Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466
(1989); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24 (1983);
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981).
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Why didn’t the Court invoke this presumption in Bond, instead of
inventing a new one?29  One possible reason is that the Bond majority did not
want to indicate that the continuing validity of Missouri v. Holland presents a
difficult constitutional question.  Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of the
three Justices who did restate the limits that constitutional federalism
imposes on treaty enforcement, Roberts and Kennedy may have wished to
stand above the fray, and the other four Justices may have liked Missouri v.
Holland.  The Bond presumption, by contrast with Catholic Bishop, requires
only that a debatable extension of statutory language would intervene in an
area traditionally reserved for the states.30  It does not require a court to
determine that the Constitution necessarily casts a shadow on congressional
action in that area.  Rather, it indicates only that federalism matters even in
the case of treaty enforcement, whether a constitutional exception exists or
not.
One implication of this reasoning is that Bond applies to all federal stat-
utes, not just those connected to a treaty.  Nonuse of the Catholic Bishop pre-
sumption might imply that federalism has force even when it does not rest on
a constitutional mandate.  Bond’s creation of a separate and distinct rule sug-
gests that all encroachments on core state functions are suspect, whether
they come close to the constitutional line or not.  If the constitutional line is
irrelevant, then the argument that treaties provide an exception to constitu-
tional federalism also does not matter.31
Two other statutory interpretive presumptions provide additional back-
ground to Bond.  The first is the presumption against violations of interna-
tional law.  Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy
announced that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”32  This pre-
29 Bond did refer to a somewhat different principle, namely that if a case presents a
constitutional and a nonconstitutional ground for decision, a court should prefer to dis-
pose of the case on the nonconstitutional ground. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2087 (2014) (citing Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam)).  This principle, like the Catholic Bishop presumption, reflects a norm of avoiding
unnecessary constitutional decisions, but addresses a court’s “order of battle” in addressing
the issues presented by case, rather than statutory interpretation as such.
30 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
31 Bond leaves open what constitutes a “core” area of state authority.  Many treaties
implemented by legislation encroach on areas of traditional state or local concern.  Exam-
ples include the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards (concerning the enforcement of contracts) and the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of Child Abduction (concerning family law).  The Court’s practice suggests that
these areas are not sufficiently vital to the balance between federal and state authority to
elicit any limiting presumption concerning the statute’s scope. See, e.g., BG Grp. PLC v.
Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (regarding the New York Convention); Chafin v. Chafin,
133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013) (regarding the Hague Convention); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1
(2010) (same); cf. Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (distinguishing federal
interference with state criminal justice process from federal interference with state prop-
erty law).
32 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
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sumption is the structural obverse of that invoked in Catholic Bishop.  It
requires the Court to decide, rather than avoid, a possibly contestable ques-
tion of international law, while Catholic Bishop rests on a policy of avoiding
hard and important questions.  What both have in common, however, is an
interpretive move that narrows the potential scope of a statute while leaving
to Congress the power to revisit the question.
The Charming Betsy presumption provided no help in deciding Bond
because the government did not argue that the Chemical Weapons Treaty
required the United States to adopt a statute that would invade areas tradi-
tionally reserved to the states.33  The Treaty sets out obligations, but does not
address how a state party might adjust its domestic law to satisfy those obliga-
tions.  The government argued that a comprehensive interpretation of the
statute lessened the risk of the United States violating the treaty, but it never
maintained that this move either avoided all disputes over treaty compliance
or was necessary to avoid a serious risk of violation.34  The case, in other
words, involved the capacity of the government to promote treaty compli-
ance, but not a substantive issue based directly on the treaty.35
Another presumption that has less direct bearing on Bond, but might
offer the best insight into the modern Court’s practice of creating and apply-
ing statutory interpretive presumptions, is the rule requiring Congress to
indicate explicitly that it wants to authorize private enforcement of a rule of
federal law.  This doctrine, which functions as a presumption against implied
causes of action, emerged first in a solo dissent by Justice Powell.36  Over the
course of the 1980s, a majority of the Court embraced it, and today’s Court
seems to regard the presumption as settled and robust.37
33 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086–87.
34 Id. at 2091.
35 Even Professor Sloss, perhaps the most vigorous supporter in this symposium of
expansive legislative power in the service of international law, does not maintain that the
Chemical Weapons Treaty requires the adoption of a federal statue governing the private
use of toxic chemicals for socially undesirable ends.  David Sloss, Bond v. United States:
Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV __ (2015).
36 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 739–42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  A
disclaimer needs repeating here: “I worked as Powell’s law clerk at the time that he wrote
this opinion, which may explain my attraction to his argument.”  Paul B. Stephan, Private
Remedies for Treaty Violations after Sanchez-Llamas, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 72 n.24
(2007).
37 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015); Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Alex-
ander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988);
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Univs.
Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 727 (2004) (recognizing a parallel between creating private rights of action and devel-
oping federal common law). But see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,
183–84 (2005) (refusing to overrule majority opinion in Cannon).
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Powell’s dissent articulates several related arguments for adoption of the
presumption.38  At bottom, they rest on a theory about legislative delibera-
tions and the impact of judicial activity.  Powell depicts the decision to
authorize private enforcement as “often controversial” and resting on “hard
political choices.”39  This implies that the question of whether private
enforcement is a good thing, from the perspective of a detached observer, is
morally neutral and subject to a contestable welfare analysis.40
Powell’s argument presumes that Congress pays attention to judicial
choices and alters its behavior in response to them.  Judicial willingness to
assume the burden of making the private enforcement decision, Powell
stated, means that “Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obliga-
tion.”41  This shirking comes at a cost: “[T]he legislative process with its pub-
lic scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to
everyone concerned. . . . [T]he public generally is denied the benefits that
are derived from the making of important societal choices through the open
debate of the democratic process.”42
Absolving Congress of responsibility for making these choices affects pri-
vate interests as well: “[T]he intended beneficiaries of the legislation are una-
ble to ensure the full measure of protection their needs may warrant.  For the
same reason, those subject to the legislative constraints are denied the oppor-
tunity to forestall through the political process potentially unnecessary and
disruptive litigation.”43  The decision to authorize private enforcement, in
other words, is a contest between competing interests, none systematically
privileged in relation to others, for which Congress, as the site of “the normal
play of political forces,” provides the best forum for resolution.44
Powell’s vision of normal politics as the preferred method for resolving
morally neutral choices with ambiguous welfare effects, as well as his charac-
terization of the choice of the boundaries of federal court remedial power as
a matter of brokering private interests as well as ascertaining the public good,
has implications beyond the recognition of private causes of action.  It under-
lies disputes about the domain of statutes, not just the method of their
enforcement.45  Presumptions that narrow a statute’s domain by deterring
extraterritorial application or violations of international law, for example,
38 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730–49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 743.
40 Powell’s position provoked criticism in the scholarly community.  Richard Stewart
and Cass Sunstein argued that statutory interests should be seen as extensions of the com-
mon law, rather than as substitutes, and that the common law enforcement mechanisms
should apply to these interests.  Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1316–22 (1982).  A dissenting opinion in a later case
alluded to this argument, but the Court never embraced it. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 832
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
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similarly assume that the ultimate decision, although constitutionally permis-
sible no matter what the choice, is Congress’s to make and that Congress
should do so in a way that ensures its own accountability for the outcome.
Powell’s Cannon dissent thus suggests the outline of a political theory that
might influence the modern Court’s statutory presumption jurisprudence.
To summarize, the Bond presumption bears a family resemblance to
other commonly invoked statutory interpretive presumptions, such as Catho-
lic Bishop (which might have applied to the case), Charming Betsy (which
could not have applied but is relevant to treaty enforcement), and the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality (which also could not have applied but
the recent robust use of which might have induced the Court to create a new
presumption in Bond).  All of these presumptions in turn overlap analytically
with the presumption against implied private causes of action, which frames
the structural issue in all such presumptions as a choice between legislative
responsibility and judicial aggrandizement.
The contemporary Court’s enthusiasm for statutory interpretive pre-
sumptions is evident.  But is it justified?  The effect of these presumptions is
to reduce the competence of the federal judiciary, by limiting either its juris-
diction or the scope of federal rules of decision that it might apply.  Federal
judicial power is not presumptively malignant; it can rectify individual injus-
tices, hold public and private actors to compliance with federal policy, and
generate precedents that can serve as a pure public good through the infor-
mation they provide.  Why employ rules that confine it?  The remainder of
this Article looks at reasons why the Court’s choice of statutory interpretive
presumptions nonetheless might advance public welfare.
II. CONTRACT THEORY AND INFORMATION-FORCING DEFAULTS
Statutory interpretation shares with contractual interpretation the goal
of eliciting meaning from texts in a manner that serves some social end.  In
the case of statutes, a court looks at the language of the enactment, which it
decodes using a variety of tools such as dictionary meaning, legislative pur-
poses express or imputed, relevant presumptions, and the like.46  Contracts
present a similar task of decoding a text by resorting to a range of interpre-
tive techniques.47
Modern contract theory focuses on problems presented by bargaining
between sophisticated parties, understood as repeat players not impaired by
systemic information asymmetries and related disabilities.48  For these actors,
theorists posit that the social goal of optimum benefit to society aligns with
the private goal of maximizing the value of the contract to the parties, absent
externalities of the sort that normally elicit a regulatory response by the
46 See generally CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2011).
47 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 276–79 (1985).
48 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 544–48 (2003).
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state.49  This postulate supports a powerful and a weak inference about the
role of the third-party interpreter assigned to resolve a dispute over a con-
tract.  The powerful inference is that the interpreter should decode the con-
tract in a manner that the parties would have specified, were they able to
contemplate the subject of the dispute and had they faced minimal bargain-
ing costs.  The interpreter should assume, in other words, that sophisticated
parties know what they are doing.  The weak inference is that the parties
should be presumed to desire interpretations of the contract that optimize its
joint value ex ante, absent indications to the contrary.50
A common problem in contractual bargaining is the presence of private
information—knowledge that one party has and the other does not—that
may affect the value of the contract.51  This information might involve states
of the world outside either parties’ control (for example, where the govern-
ment will locate a highway), but it also may entail information about a party’s
preferences and capabilities.  Contract theory focuses on the latter.52  In
Hadley, for example, the Court posited that the shipper knew, but the carrier
did not know, that late delivery of the new axle would have an enormous
impact on the shipper’s business.53  By hypothesis, disclosure would have
benefited both parties: The shipper would have had access to a stronger con-
tractual guarantee with greater penalties for default, and the carrier would
have gotten a higher fee for its services.  If the shipper chooses not to disclose
when knowing that a weaker contract would result, it reveals that the cost of a
stronger contract (including the cost of revealing information that it might
prefer to keep private) is greater than the value of the incremental protec-
tion.  If the parties know what they are doing, the information-forcing default
rule works to induce disclosure when doing so will increase the joint surplus
value of the contract, and will not when doing so would not optimize the
joint surplus.
The reference to joint surplus might require some unpacking.  Contract
theory assumes that the purpose of contract is to encourage reliance that
lowers the cost of cooperation and makes the undertaking of desirable activ-
ity more feasible.  It posits that contracts create a surplus over the value of the
possible relationship in the absence of legal enforceability.54  The value cre-
ated by the contract is the main thing, and the distribution of the joint sur-
plus is secondary.  Experienced parties will reach a reasonable distribution of
the benefits of cooperation, but these benefits—the joint surplus—exist only
because enforceable contracts enable the cooperation in the first place.
49 Id. at 554.
50 Goetz & Scott, supra note 47, at 306–09.
51 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–9 (1978).
52 As to exogenous information, the argument for reducing the acquirer’s rights to
control by imposing a duty to disclose is weaker. See id. at 32–33.
53 94 Ex. 341, 349, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 149 (1854).
54 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1274–1286 (1980).
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To return to Hadley, the shipper of course would prefer a rule that pro-
vided consequential damages whether it disclosed or not.  But if this rule
were known to the carrier, it then would impose a surcharge on all customers
reflecting the value of the stochastic range of damages that its customers
might suffer.  The carrier in effect would bundle an insurance policy along
with each contract of carriage.  Combining these two distinct products may
or may not be optimal, but it is not crazy to think that separating them would
benefit shippers as a whole by giving them more choices.55
Contract theorists describe these rules as belonging to a more general
category of majoritarian defaults.  As noted above, their strongest claim is
that interpreters should honor party preferences in the absence of externali-
ties.  Majoritarian defaults are those rules that a majority of contracting par-
ties would prefer to find in their contracts at the time of contract formation,
before downstream events reveal which provisions advantage or disadvantage
which party.56  In the absence of externalities associated with the contract,
society should focus on minimizing the transaction costs associated with con-
tract formation.  Bargaining is costly, so using majoritarian defaults as the
presumptive interpretive outcome spares parties the cost of adverting to, and
perhaps haggling over, these terms.57
Avoiding the costs of bargaining means using off-the-rack terms that can-
not meet the needs of all prospective parties.  What the majority wants usu-
ally is not what everyone wants.  Theorists respond to this dilemma by
distinguishing between conventional and idiosyncratic parties.58  If a rule fits
the needs of a substantial majority of potential contractors, using it as a
default allows the greater number of parties to avoid bargaining.59  The idio-
syncratic party then bears the burden of bargaining for unconventional terms
to satisfy its atypical characteristics.  Assuming that the idiosyncratic party
faces no unusual bargaining costs or that no overriding social concern might
justify special treatment for this particular idiosyncrasy, embracing
55 Again, the claim applies only to sophisticated repeat-player shippers, not to inexpe-
rienced consumers who rarely ship and have difficulty assessing the risks associated with
particular contracts.  The argument in text also assumes, unrealistically, that carriers do
not also have private information that shippers might value.  For discussion of complica-
tions with Hadley under certain conditions, see Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1559–60 (1999); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 616–18
(1990); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 406–11 (1993); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing
Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 919–23 (2015).
56 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989).
57 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at 594–609; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 606–13 (1990).
58 Goetz & Scott, supra note 47, at 266.
59 Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
Rev. 563, 568 (2006); Scott, supra note 57, at 607–08.
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majoritarian defaults should lower the cost of contracting and thus maximize
the social benefit from contractual cooperation.60
It might be the case, for example, that it is rare for a shipper to need a
part to arrive on time to avoid a catastrophic loss.  The court in Hadley
seemed to think so.61  If this assumption matches reality, and if the ceteris
paribus limitation applies, the announced rule might lower bargaining costs
without an unacceptable offsetting welfare loss.  The cost to the idiosyncratic
shipper of identifying its status would be less than the social benefit of saved
costs in the majority of bargaining contexts.
Conversely, it instead might be true that most carriers adhere to a high
standard of reliability.  Only a minority might have private knowledge of spe-
cial incapacities that will reduce the likelihood of on-time delivery.  Where
this is true, contract law might require the carrier to disclose this incapacity
as a condition for avoiding the imposition of consequential damages.
As this example illustrates, a majoritarian default rule works as an infor-
mation-forcing default with respect to the unconventional contractual party.
It is a rule that a majority of parties would prefer, because it reduces bargain-
ing costs while providing valuable inducements to disclose private informa-
tion that contributes to the contract’s joint surplus.  The selection of a
particular rule thus rests on a guess about the state of the world, namely
which attributes are general and which are idiosyncratic.
The adoption of the “majoritarian default” terminology arose partly in
response to an influential paper proposing the adoption of “penalty
defaults.”  The latter are rules that compel parties to reveal socially useful
information that they otherwise would prefer not to disclose.62  That paper
sowed some confusion because it seemed to propose a theory that would
explain information forcing both when parties preferred this outcome and
when they did not.  Later work clarified that a nonmajoritarian penal default
comprises only information-forcing presumptions imposed by society in
instances where the contractual parties, in the absence of social intervention,
would reach contracts that would maximize their private contractual surplus
but, due to externalities associated with the contract, would harm society as a
whole.63  A simple example would be a contract with anticompetitive effects.
Although private law scholars might understand the externality versus
no externality distinction well enough, public law scholars writing about stat-
utory interpretation have not always demonstrated a clear grasp of the differ-
ence.  In some cases, their work seems to assume that nonmajoritarian penal
defaults are the dominant outcome dictated by social welfare policy, rather
60 Goetz & Scott, supra note 47, at 265–67; Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The
Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1948–53
(2011).
61 94 Ex. 341, 356, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151–52 (1854).
62 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 56.
63 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).  For criticism of the nonmajoritarian-penalty-default
concept, see Posner, supra note 59, at 570.
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than an exceptional result.64  This confusion over the distinction between
conventional information-forcing interpretive devices (majoritarian defaults,
because they reflect the preferences of a majority of contractors), and penal
defaults (rules that persons in the shoes of the contracting parties would not
prefer ex ante) rests on a failure to specify the conditions under which con-
tractual relationships generate externalities that cause the parties’ incentives
to diverge from optimal social welfare.  Penalty defaults, as rules of interpre-
tation, can respond to externalities produced by contracts.  But that capacity
does not distinguish this mechanism from other forms of regulation, such as
a special statutory or administrative regime.  More importantly, it overlooks
the large range of information-forcing defaults that enhance both the par-
ties’ welfare and that of society as a whole.
What contract theory teaches us, in sum, is not that the rules of interpre-
tation should seek to maximize the volume of information disclosure.  Actors
acquire information at a cost and, economics teaches, may acquire less of it if
the law forces them to part with it other than on their own terms.  What the
law should do, at least from a welfare perspective and in the absence of exter-
nalities, is induce optimal disclosure, namely those releases of information
that, through contract-based compensation, will produce a net benefit for
the persons that possess it.  If externalities exist, a range of regulatory
responses are available, including the application of penal defaults.  The
choice of regulatory response rests in turn, from an economic perspective,
on a careful cost-benefit analysis informed by empirical investigation.
A full understanding of information-forcing defaults requires an appre-
ciation of other contractual mechanisms that solve other information
problems.  Sophisticated parties may confront situations where the value of
cooperation turns on information that will emerge only in the course of a
contractual relationship.  Different contingencies will affect the value of the
joint surplus, but the parties lack the information to make confident calcula-
tion of the probabilities that can be assigned to these contingencies.  The
problem in these cases is not inducing information sharing at the time of
contract formation, but capturing through contractual design the benefits of
downstream information.65
Parties always can renegotiate the terms of the agreement in light of new
information, but this approach has its own problems.  If party investments in
64 See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 152–56 (2008); William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85,
121 (1998); Rebecca M. Kysar, Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 953,
959–65 (2011); see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 664 (2004) (using the concept of penalty defaults to analyze the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine).  In the case of Professor Elhauge, the confusion
might stem from his deep expertise in antitrust law, a field that focuses on privately benefi-
cial but socially harmful contracts.  Concentrating on contracts that cry out for regulation
easily can distract one from the core features of the large majority of contracts that
advance social welfare.
65 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 837–39, 840–48 (2006).
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the relationship are asymmetrical, the less invested party might hold up the
other.  Knowing this in advance, parties might avoid making such contracts
altogether.  An alternative approach to this problem is instead to delegate to
a third party, such as a judge or arbiter, the authority to round out the con-
tract once the contingencies are resolved.  Contract theorists argue that com-
mon contractual terms such as “best efforts” or “material adverse change”
have this function and under plausible conditions may optimize welfare.66
Contract theorists emphasize two aspects of this mechanism.  First, the
parties design the delegation, rather than counting on third parties generally
to overlay general standards of fairness on otherwise specific and precise con-
tractual terms.67  In other words, contract law does not assume that delega-
tion is invariably optimal, even though the problem of contingent future
states is pervasive in all contracts.  Second, the mechanism does not force the
disclosure of private information at the time of contracting but rather func-
tions to take advantage of information that was unknowable at the time of
contracting and will enhance the value of the contract.68  Accordingly, theo-
rists advise adjudicators not to assume a general delegation to fill in con-
tracts, but rather to adhere closely to their terms of reference.69
The delegation mechanism puts in relief the function of information-
forcing defaults.  To the extent a contract authorizes a downstream adjudica-
tor to remodel the contract to account for information available at the time
of dispute, it reduces the incentive of the parties to reveal private informa-
tion at the time of contract formation.  Information-forcing defaults work
only to the extent that the failure to share information has consequences.
Optimal contracts thus distinguish between private information existing at
the time of contract formation and information developed in the course of a
contractual transaction.  Information-forcing defaults address the former,
third-party delegation the latter.
This stripped-down account of contract theory has several implications
for an assessment of statutory interpretive presumptions.  First, contract the-
ory posits as its goal optimizing the value of contractual relationships (the
joint surplus) in the absence of externalities.  Similarly, interpreters of stat-
utes may seek to optimize the value of the legal relationships that a statute
might establish.  Second, contract theory focuses on incentives to share pri-
vate information in the process of contract formation, both in the absence
and presence of externalities.  Information-forcing defaults, which have a
similar structure to statutory interpretive presumptions, should apply when
sharing the information will either increase the value of the joint surplus or,
66 SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 7, at 72–75; Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic
Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852–55
(2010); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377,
1415–22 (2010); Scott & Triantis, supra note 65, at 817–19.
67 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 66, at 1382–83 & n.9.
68 Id. at 1383–84.
69 Scott & Triantis, supra note 65, at 848–49.
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perhaps more rarely, respond to an externality.  Interpreters of statutes also
may use presumptions as opportunities to bring into the public domain
socially valuable information.  Third, the choice of information-forcing
defaults is affected by bargaining costs, which ceteris paribus they seek to mini-
mize.70  The use of majoritarian defaults in low-externality contexts achieves
this goal.  Statutory interpreters similarly might minimize the costs of bar-
gaining over legislative content by interpreting the enactment to reach
results that the Congress most likely preferred at the time of enactment.
Fourth, contract theory posits another mechanism, third-party delegation, to
deal with a functionally distinct information problem, namely anticipated
future information, the assessment of which is optimal when ex post.  Statu-
tory interpretation similarly can ask whether the legislators sought to dele-
gate to courts the power to modify the statutory mandate in light of
downstream information.
III. INFORMATION-FORCING DEFAULTS AND THE CONGRESS-JUDICIARY DYAD
For many, making the leap from contracts to institutional separation of
powers may provoke more skepticism than interest.  The Constitution, to be
sure, is a contract, but the identity of the parties is both a bit mysterious and a
point of contention in political theory.  Moreover, even if one takes a purely
rationalist and utilitarian approach to both bodies of law, important diver-
gences emerge.  The general public normally has a direct interest in the out-
come of public law disputes, while the adjudication of private disputes largely
engages the interests of the particular parties.71
Still, one can translate insights from one field to the other.  Both public
law and contract law involve the use of legal mechanisms to pursue coopera-
tive ventures.  Strategies that address the problems that private ordering
encounters and, to some extent, solves can help us unpack questions of pub-
lic regulation.  Even those scholars who do not work with law and economics,
much less contract theory, would agree that statutory interpretive presump-
tions function as a means of managing the relationship between Congress
and the judiciary.72  To the extent that legislators pay attention to the courts,
their enactments should reflect the rules of interpretation that the courts
have announced they will apply.  Courts in turn should take account of the
capacities of this audience when they announce their interpretive rules.
Contract theory models the world based on sophisticated actors driven
out of considerations of (not necessarily self-conscious) gain optimization
that has at least some observable and even quantifiable aspects.73  For the
translation of this theory to legislative interpretation to work, one must have
some sense of what motivates Congress, what drives the federal judicial pro-
70 Scott & Triantis, supra note 65, at 823–24.
71 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2145–47 (2002).
72 ELHAUGE, supra note 64, at 168–87.
73 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 66, at 1386.
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cess, and how the two institutions respond to each other’s actions.  A vast
scholarly literature exists on all three subjects.  For present purposes, how-
ever, it should suffice to propose fairly simple and informal models of the
functions of Congress and the judiciary in a context of dynamic interaction.
Throughout, this analysis equates social welfare with maximization of
democratic preferences, i.e., the summed preferences of all members of the
polity.  To clarify, I assume that one purpose of constitutional rules is to sup-
press those realizations of democratic preferences that might harm social
welfare.  My discussion thus is limited to lawmaking that does not encroach
on constitutionally protected interests.
A. Dynamic Effects
Whatever the motivations of Congress and the federal judiciary, one can-
not assert that judicially articulated presumptions in statutory interpretation
will function as information-forcing defaults without positing some relation-
ship between congressional and judicial practice.  An information-forcing
default works only if actors pay attention to it.  For the theory to capture
reality, the legislature both must care about the default and have the capacity
to respond to applications of presumptions that do not reflect its
preferences.
In the legislative process, Congress has two chances to take judicial reac-
tion into account.  First, it can draft statutes with the default in mind.  At the
moment of enactment it can provide the information that the default forces
by either accepting the default or indicating clearly that it prefers the pre-
sumed-against outcome.  Second, Congress can respond to unanticipated
judicial applications of a presumption by adopting new legislation that makes
its preference explicit.
Neither point of interaction is frictionless.  Legislators might focus more
on the process of producing an enactment than considering the downstream
implications of the statute’s enforcement.  Features of the legislative process
designed to forestall hasty decisionmaking, such as committee structure, fili-
busters, linkage to irreconcilable conflicts, and other obstacles, might block
adoption of a statute that would respond to an unanticipated and unwanted
judicial application of a default.74  The greater the friction at either point,
the less likely that information-forcing defaults will work as intended.75
Estimating the size of these barriers’ effects is difficult.  Private con-
tracting also may respond less than perfectly to downstream legal changes.
New contractual terms, even if provoked by unanticipated court decisions,
are costly to incorporate into standardized contracts.  Boilerplate terms thus
may survive unwanted judicial applications.76  Yet considerable evidence indi-
74 See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2015).
75 ELHAUGE, supra note 64, at 157–65.
76 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION
2 (2013).
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cates that the standard contract theory of interpretation, with its emphasis on
majoritarian defaults and dynamic interaction between default terms and
contract formation by sophisticated parties, captures a significant slice of
reality.77
Similarly, it seems implausible that Congress and the judiciary operate
completely independent of each other.  Even if the legislative process con-
tains substantial elements of kabuki and short-term gamesmanship, enacted
statutes do have consequences, in some instance due to judicial enforcement.
These consequences affect democratic preferences, about which legislators
have some incentive to care (as discussed in the next Section).  It is simply
implausible that Congress remains invincibly ignorant of potential judicial
reaction to its work product, even if other concerns compete for legislators’
limited mind space.
Moreover, Congress has demonstrable capacity to respond to judicial
interpretation.  In areas of specialized law that rely heavily on judicial
enforcement, such as taxation, legislative responses to antigovernment, and
to a lesser extent anti-individual, outcomes are reasonably expeditious.78
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that Congress can and does respond to
information-forcing interpretative defaults.79
On balance, then, it is not foolish to believe that the feedback loop
between Congress and the federal courts does function, even if imperfectly.
In matters of statutory interpretation, courts do not have the final word.
Congress cares about many things, including how its enactments work out in
practice, and engages in ongoing supervision of judicial implementation of
its edicts.  In this environment, information forcing through statutory inter-
pretive presumptions can occur.
B. Models of Legislative Motivation
To evaluate the impact of information forcing in statutory interpreta-
tion, one needs some sense of what both legislatures and courts seek to
accomplish.  Information-forcing defaults might either help Congress to
enact laws that better express its best guess about social welfare, or thwart it
77 Id. at 1–8.
78 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 334, 343–45 (1991).
79 For the response to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), see Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012)) (amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
to apply extraterritorially).  For the response to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561
U.S. 247 (2010), see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v) (amending the Securities Exchange Act to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction in
suits by the government involving significant conduct or substantial effects in the United
States).
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from adopting beneficial laws.  I first consider what we might imagine Con-
gress seeks to optimize when it adopts legislation.80
Any model of legislative motivation must posit some connection between
legislators’ preferences and those of electors.  In a democracy, a legislator
faces some kind of electoral accountability.  The strength and scope of this
accountability may turn on many factors, including party structure, historical
contingency, voting rules, effectiveness of third-party oversight, and the like,
but the existence of some kind of popular check on legislative preferences is
assumed in all the models I discuss here.
For simplicity’s sake, I propose four highly stylized conceptions of legis-
lative preferences based on electoral pressure.  The models focus on two vari-
ables, namely the ability of legislators to separate future voter preferences
from current ones, and the degree that voter preferences are weighted rather
than uniform.  These choices omit a great deal of useful knowledge, but have
the advantage of tractability.
The leadership model depicts a legislature as comprising policy-driven
advocates operating under systemic uncertainty.  The legislators understand
that they face electoral accountability based on the preferences of their elec-
tors at some future date.  They also believe, however, that current evidence of
electoral preferences (measured, say, by opinion polls) may be insufficient to
base a prediction of what those preferences will be at the relevant time.  Suc-
cessful legislators (in the sense that they keep on getting reelected) have
superior ability both to predict popular sentiment and to shape it.  Under
this model, legislators function as norm entrepreneurs.  Through both per-
suasion and action, these legislators create conditions that induce electors to
embrace their preferences, whatever the state of the elector’s preferences at
the time of the legislators’ salient actions.81
The passive model views legislators as focused mostly on reelection and
legislative votes as tools to be disposed of toward that end.  Unlike the first
model, these legislators cannot predict with confidence how adoption of the
legislation will alter voter preferences.  Moreover, they lack any comparative
advantage in influencing voter opinions.  The legislator takes whatever
actions (and inactions) are most likely to lead to reelection based on what
80 For purposes of simplicity, I ignore the Executive as a separate lawmaking actor.
One could just as well say that the political branches together make law that the courts
must interpret.  Hence, when I refer to Congress or the legislature, I mean to take in any
modifications or extensions that emerge in the administrative process, and when I refer to
a statute, I mean to include any administrative actions taken under the statute’s authority.
By disregarding the separate roles of Congress and the Executive in lawmaking, one can
avoid issues of administrative law and judicial review of administrative action.  For further
discussion of the problem, see ELHAUGE, supra note 64, at 79–111.
81 This model is consistent with the Burkean position that a legislator should instruct
the electorate as to its best interests, rather than slavishly following its current desires.
Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE
EDMUND BURKE 95–97 (8th ed. 1884).  One need not embrace Burke’s views to accept a
general account of legislator accountability based on future voter preferences that the leg-
islator has some ability to shape.
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that legislator currently knows about voter preferences.  Unlike the leader-
ship model, these legislators invest in determining what voters want rather
than in shaping those preferences.82
The public choice model draws on public choice theory to depict legislators
as willing to place their votes at the disposition of powerful interest groups
that enjoy a competitive advantage in influencing electoral outcomes, relative
to dispersed and heterogeneous voters, and to ignore the politically power-
less altogether.  These legislators do not act corruptly, in the sense that they
receive private benefits for their votes, but rather rationally, in the sense that
favoring well-organized and homogenous groups can improve their chances
of reelection even though the public welfare suffers.  The model assumes
that the capacity and willingness of interest groups to reward or punish legis-
lators exceeds by a substantial margin that of dispersed and heterogeneous
groups, magnifying the impact of the former on electoral outcomes, and that
some potential voters as a practical matter have no effect on legislative
outcomes.83
Finally, the crusader model assumes both some legislator agency, as does
the leadership model, and weighted voter preferences based on intensity and
organizational advantages, as does the interest group model.  Under these
conditions, legislators may respond to powerful interest groups in two ways.
They might magnify interest group influence by inducing mainstream voters
to embrace interest group causes.  Alternatively, they could combat interest
groups by exposing the gap between interest group payoffs and the public
good.  Depending on the circumstances, either strategy might be a winning
play.
C. Models of Judicial Motivation
To determine whether statutory interpretation presumptions advance
benign information forcing or instead frustrate the fulfilment of democrati-
cally approved policy, we must have some sense of what judges seek to do
when they decide cases.  But developing a credible model of judicial motiva-
tion presents a challenge.  Sociological and ideological considerations seem
to do a better job of explaining the motivation of federal judges than do
material inducements such as job retention.  Article III’s life-tenure and no-
reduction-in-pay protections, along with a narrow reading of the impeach-
82 This model does not require a flawless legislative process, but does posit that compe-
tition among interest groups dissipates the rents that legislation otherwise might provide.
Gary Becker developed an influential model of legislative rent dissipation in response to
public choice literature cited in note 83, infra.  Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
83 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); DEN-
NIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965).  For discussion of the implications of public choice theory for law, see
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
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ment power, largely insulate these judges from accountability to Congress.84
Such external constraints as exist on their behavior work mostly through
reputational effects.85  Yet reputations vary greatly among communities and
over time, whatever the contribution of the judge to the outcome.
Again for reasons of tractability, I will concentrate on two general attrib-
utes that can vary among federal judges.  First, a judge might (or might not)
regard his or her preferences as superior to those expressed by conventional
political processes.  Second, a judge might (or might not) seek to compen-
sate for structural defects in the manner in which Congress translates demo-
cratic preferences into legislation.  As with the reductionist depiction of
legislator preferences sketched out above, a two by two matrix results.
The Olympian model regards judges as largely self-regarding.  These
judges consider their moral rectitude, intellectual talents, and capacity for
reflection unpolluted by quotidian politics as superior to that of the median
voter.  They substitute their own preferences for those expressed through
legislation because they believe society will thereby benefit.  Concern about
reputation might encourage such judges to dissemble somewhat about their
motivation, but they will seize any opportunity to instruct and elevate the
public.  Like the legislator depicted in the leadership model, these judges
also may believe that they can shape public preferences through persuasion
and the benign effects of their wise decisions.  Accordingly, these judges also
are norm entrepreneurs.
The reformer model assumes that judges prefer their own preferences to
those expressed by the democratic process and also regard the legislative pro-
cess as a flawed means of representing the preferences of median voters.  To
some extent these qualities reinforce each other, as an appreciation of the
shortcomings in legislative decisionmaking may induce judges to turn to
their preferences as an alternative.  In the most extreme instance, a judge
might regard a failure to adopt a preferred outcome as prima facie evidence
of a fundamental structural defect in the legislative process.  Recognizing the
unattractiveness of vanity as a reputational quality, however, these judges
might rely more openly on process defects as a ground for decision in partic-
ular cases.  At the same time, they would welcome arguments about process
defects as an excuse for substituting their preferences for those expressed in
legislative outcomes.
The modesty model depicts judges as skeptical about their comparative
advantage in ascertaining the public good.  They will implement democratic
preferences wherever they find them expressed.  They also doubt their capac-
84 The Senate’s acquittal of Samuel Chase in 1805 is conventionally seen as ending the
possibility of removing Article III judges simply because of a change of political regime.
Alexander Pope Humphrey, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 5 VA. L. REG. 281, 293 (1899);
Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges,
95 GEO. L.J. 965, 988 (2007).
85 See Barry Cushman, Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 738–49 (2003)
(reviewing JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIRS OF JOHN KNOX (David J. Garrow & Den-
nis J. Hutchinson eds., 2002)) (discussing history of judicial efforts to build reputation).
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ity to correct the shortcomings of the legislative process.  They thus believe
that loyal, almost anonymous deference to the popular will as formally
expressed through legislation will do more for their reputation than any
effort to improve society on their own account.  In economic terms, they see
themselves as agents whose principal job is the minimization of agency
costs.86
The process model assumes that judges seek to implement democratic
preferences but recognize that structural defects in the legislative process
may thwart the accurate expression of those preferences.87  Unlike the
reformer model, these judges approach the issue of structural defects strin-
gently.  Two general categories of structural arguments that such judges
might embrace are systematic exclusion from the political process
(powerlessness) and uneven weighting of voter preferences due to public
choice effects.  In the absence of evidence of structural defects, these judges
will behave in accordance with the modesty model.88
These reductionist models hardly capture all that motivates federal
judges.  But they do identify the factors most likely to determine whether
information-forcing presumptions reinforce or thwart legislative preferences
and advance or harm social welfare.  I consider these issues in the next
Section.
D. Assessing Information-Forcing in Statutory Interpretation
To avoid dealing with sixteen separate pairings of models, I make several
simplifying, but plausible, assumptions.  First, the entire analysis fails if one
institution is associated with systematically benign inclinations and the other
with systematic defects.  Under these conditions, institutional attributes
become irrelevant and one instead looks simply for the best policy.  I do not
mean to exclude the possibility that, in any historical moment, one institu-
tion might seek to enact preferences that reflect the popular will or otherwise
promote social welfare, and the other might oppose those outcomes.  The
point instead is that these moments seem historically contingent and not sus-
ceptible to positive economic analysis.
86 Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 551–52.
87 Process models are most familiar in constitutional theory, where they serve to justify
constitutional review of the acts of the political departments by the judiciary. E.g., JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  As Elhauge has argued, however, the same
arguments can underlie a theory of statutory interpretation. ELHAUGE, supra note 64, at
168–87.
88 One might embrace one or the other of these accounts of legislative dysfunction,
but not necessarily both.  Elhauge, for example, argues against the comparative advantage
of judges in addressing public choice problems but supports rules of statutory interpreta-
tion that take account of the interests of systematically powerless voters. Compare ELHAUGE,
supra note 64, at 168–87, with id. at 163 and Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).  The distinction rests on
assumptions about the ability of judges to detect these effects at particular degrees of
granularity.
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A nonobvious corollary of this argument is that certain attributes, such
as the ability to engage in preference shaping, are not specific to particular
institutions.  There is no reason to believe that, as a general matter, a legisla-
ture containing successful norm entrepreneurs will function alongside a judi-
ciary that has no capacity to persuade and uplift the general public.  At the a
priori stage, the ability to mold public preferences ought to be shared by all
public actors or none.
To be clear, I am not arguing that such disjunctions do not arise in the
real world.  Rather, as suggested above, it seems likely that their occurrence
results from random, and most likely transient, social variation rather than as
an inevitable result of fundamental conditions.  To the extent that a particu-
lar historical moment contains, say, a leadership legislature and a passive
judiciary, the analytic problem is essentially no different from that arising
from the assignment of socially benign leadership ability to one institution
and malign leadership to the other.  In both cases, the differences may be
very interesting, but a positive economic analysis has nothing significant to
offer.
Second, although the models capture logically distinct characteristics,
external observation of some of these distinctions seems unlikely.  As a practi-
cal matter, for example, very few judges would own up to all that the Olym-
pian model implies when the reformer account would be available.  Similarly,
distinguishing the leadership from the crusader models of legislative choice
seems unnecessary.  Both emphasize the norm-shaping capacity of the legisla-
ture and, as a result of the first simplifying assumption noted above, are
agnostic as to the social benefits of this ability.
Finally, assigning to the judiciary a mission to combat the effects of dis-
tortions in the legislative process becomes irrelevant if those effects either do
not exist or are too subtle for judges to detect.  The process model matters
only if judges can distinguish outcomes that reflect true democratic prefer-
ences based on inclusion and equality of all voters from those that do not.
This process of elimination leaves us with four model combinations.
Legislators with the capacity and confidence to lead the electorate might con-
front judges who prefer their preferences to those expressed by the legisla-
ture (the leadership-Olympian dyad).  Legislators who simply identify and act
on current preferences of all voters might confront judges who simply try to
ascertain what the legislature wants (the passive-modest dyad).  Legislators
who reflect the weighted preferences of voters, given powerlessness or public
choice factors, might confront judges who seek to overcome such structural
problems (the public choice-process dyad).  Finally, legislators who act on
voter preferences as filtered through a flawed system (due either to public
choice or powerlessness effects) might confront a judiciary that seeks to give
the legislature what it wants (the public choice-passive dyad).  Each has dis-
tinct implications for the efficacy of information-forcing presumptions.
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1. Leadership Legislative Model and Olympian Judicial Model
In this combination of models, both Congress and the judiciary are
occupied by people with some confidence in their ability to shape public
opinion, rather than passively follow it.  In the case of the legislators, an elec-
toral constraint weeds out persons who are systematically unsuccessful at
leading the electorate.  Judges do not face as strong a limit on their discre-
tion, in the sense that they answer to history rather than to voters, and the
judgment of history may shift over time.  At least over the short term, it is
impossible to tell ex ante whether either’s preferences will lead to social wel-
fare optimization or not.
This scenario presents the circumstances where the case for information-
forcing presumptions is weakest.  If legislative and judicial preferences over-
lap, the judiciary should not need additional information to mold the
enacted law to their shared purposes.  Teleology should do all the work.  If
their preferences instead conflict, one would expect the judiciary to obstruct
the legislative agenda.  Invoking an interpretive presumption allows the judi-
ciary to trump the legislature’s preferred outcome.  The restrictive interpre-
tation of a statute produced by a presumption delays the intended effect
without resort to a constitutional confrontation.
These conditions also raise the greatest doubts about inferred delega-
tions of discretionary authority.  Again, if legislative and judicial preferences
overlap, delegations are likely to be clear.  If these preferences conflict,
judges would be inclined to find delegations wherever they can.  In these
circumstances, an inference of a delegation would achieve the same result as
imposition of an interpretive presumption, namely raising the costs to Con-
gress of adopting laws that implement its, and not the judiciary’s,
preferences.
2. Passive Legislative Model and Modest Judicial Model
This combination of models generates the least complicated account of
interactions between Congress and the federal judiciary.  Congress seeks only
to express current democratic preferences.  Any gap between its actions and
the preferences of the median voter represents irreducible agency costs
(noise, if you will) rather than structural deficiencies in electoral accountabil-
ity.  The judiciary in turns seeks only to ascertain what Congress wants.
Where an enactment is clear, judges follow its instructions without embellish-
ment.  When faced with ambiguity, judges look for the strategy that is most
likely to bring about the outcome that Congress prefers.
These conditions correspond to those applicable to contract interpreta-
tion in the absence of externalities.  If one excludes both structural flaws in
the legislative process and the possibility that judicial policy preferences are
anything but neutral with respect to optimal social outcomes, then judges
ought to treat legislators just as if they were sophisticated contracting parties.
For exactly the reason that  judges engaged in contractual interpretation
should seek to realize party preferences in these circumstances, judges
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engaged in statutory interpretation should undertake that task in a manner
that results in the best expression of legislative preferences.
In an externality-free world, contract theory counsels courts to apply all
clearly expressed rules.  Where a statute is ambiguous, a court should deter-
mine, based on context as well as choice of statutory language, whether Con-
gress meant to use a delegation mechanism that would allow courts to take
account of post-enactment information.  If the prerequisites for inferring
such a mechanism do not exist, then a court should invoke an interpretative
presumption that best matches the most likely substantive outcome that Con-
gress would prefer.  Such a presumption would be the equivalent of a
majoritarian default in contract.
Modest judges seeking to identify majoritarian defaults should look at all
credible evidence of legislative preferences.  They might, for instance, take a
negative approach, identifying policy areas that, evidence suggests, Congress
regards as difficult and wishes to avoid.  Consistent with the conditions speci-
fied by this model, the judges would not substitute their own intuitions about
difficult areas for evidence of legislative preference.
3. Public Choice Legislative Model and Process Judicial Model
Unlike the prior pairing, this dyad depicts a legislative process impaired
by structural flaws and a judiciary that has the capacity and inclination to
identify and push back against outcomes that reflect those flaws.  The precise
nature of these flaws is, for present purposes, immaterial.  Interest groups
may have disproportionate influence that allows them to capture economic
rents through suboptimal legislation.  Alternatively or in addition, systematic
discrimination or pervasive poverty might deny some groups effective politi-
cal power.  The model assumes that the flaws do not affect everything that
Congress does, but that their effects, when they do occur, are observable by
the judiciary.
When a law emerges from the legislative process without apparent
effects from structural deficiencies, a process-model court will approach its
interpretation in the same manner as if a passive-model legislature had
enacted it.  In that case, the analysis reduces to that described in the prior
subsection.
Where a process-model court detects the effects of structural deficien-
cies, however, it will seek to counter them.  Imposition of a true penal
default, i.e., an information-forcing mechanism that does not reflect assumed
legislative preferences, is one way to pursue this strategy.  A penal default
functions somewhat like a tax on socially undesirable behavior.  It requires
Congress to reaffirm its commitment to a suboptimal outcome in a more
explicit manner.  Not only must the legislature reassemble the coalition that
supported the enactment the first time, but it must make the law more
explicit.  Greater clarity might lead to more democratic accountability and
consequently greater resistance to the project.  Aware of this, the legislature
in marginal cases will not readopt the measure.
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4. Public Choice Legislative Model and Modest Judicial Model
In this combination of models, the legislature adopts some laws that do
not reflect democratic preferences but the judiciary lacks the capacity to dis-
tinguish between enactments that result from flawed legislative processes and
those that do not.  Judges still will craft presumptions to induce clarification
of legislative preferences and will base the default outcome on their percep-
tion of the most likely legislative preference.  As in the second dyad (passive
legislative model and modest judicial model), they will not apply any penal
defaults because, by assumption, they cannot distinguish flawed expressions
of democratic preferences from normal ones.  Here, however, this modesty
creates a problem.
Under the assumptions of the second dyad, statutory interpretive pre-
sumptions generally advance social welfare.  But once one introduces struc-
tural deficiencies that distort legislative outcomes relative to democratic
preferences, the judiciary’s loyalty to legislative preferences brings about
suboptimal results.  Courts fail to discourage the adoption of laws that
exclude the powerless or reward special interests at the expense of the gen-
eral public.  This deficiency, however, results from too few defaults that limit
the scope of enactments, not too many.
E. Bond and Social Welfare
The foregoing provides an analytic structure for determining when pre-
sumptions like that articulated in Bond make us better off, and when they do
not.  As argued above, the analysis provides no help in cases where, in the
particular historical moment, the legislature and the judiciary act on the
basis of conflicting normative commitments not derived from democratic
preferences.  In particular, it does not help anyone with commitments to nor-
mative outcomes other than welfare maximization.  It has greatest value in
cases where Congress seeks to act on the basis of democratic preferences, and
the judiciary seeks to elicit legislative preferences.
With these limits, an analysis derived from the contract theory approach
to information-forcing defaults might address several questions.  Does the
Bond problem—legislation that ambiguously displaces pre-existing state legal
regimes, not necessarily in a manner that raises constitutional concerns—
represent an area where Congress plausibly may expect downstream informa-
tion not available at the time of enactment to affect the choice of whether to
encroach or not?  If the answer to that question is no, what would be the
most likely congressional preference about encroachment?  Are there any
reasons to think that defects in the legislative process might distort congres-
sional preferences on this issue?
First, it seems unlikely that the ideal rule for displacing legal regimes
involving core state functions depends on the development of downstream
information.  To be sure, the optimal distribution of national and local regu-
lation might shift over time in response to changes in technology, communi-
cation, transportation, and other structures that shape the nature of social
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behavior and its externalities.  But Congress certainly acts in awareness of the
basic structure of federalism.  Many members of Congress come up through
the ranks of state politics and presumably have a highly developed sense of
the current balance of authority.  Nor is there anything about the context to
indicate great dependence on future events.  Those structural changes that
might shift the balance between federal and state authority are unlikely to
emerge as rapid transformations, but rather as gradual adjustments to phe-
nomena that the general public, and therefore Congress, recognizes.
Needless to say, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
contained no language indicating a congressional desire to delegate to the
judiciary the discretion to adjust the statute to changing conditions of feder-
alism.89  Moreover, the context does not suggest such a preference. Down-
stream information does not seem to play much of a role in determining the
best adjustment to federalist concerns.  Accordingly, the answer to the first
question seems to be a negative.
Second, imputing to Congress a desire to avoid undue interference with
traditional areas of state authority, and then basing a majoritarian default on
this move, seems defensible.  To be sure, the impact of interference resulting
from extension of federal criminal law is limited, because it does not put
demands on the resources of state or local governments.90  But the question
is which branch of government has conclusive authority over criminalization
of socially undesirable conduct.  Although the federal charges against Bond
did not bar Pennsylvania from reaching the opposite conclusion, the federal
prosecution did prevent Pennsylvania from giving effect to its considered
assessment of the proper response to Bond’s conduct.91
The facts of the dispute bolster the argument that the Court chose an
appropriate majoritarian default.  Nothing in the case implicated an enacted
federal policy.  The chemicals that Bond appropriated for her bizarre
scheme were not subject to a specific federal regulatory regime.92  The injury
she sought to inflict—bodily harm to a romantic rival—implicated no signifi-
cant federal interest.93  The link between her conduct and the Chemical
Weapons Convention was, at best, tenuous.94  One cannot believe that any
other party to the Convention would have faulted the United States had the
local decision not to bring charges prevailed.  If anything, one might suspect
that Congress would have been dismayed to learn that federal prosecutorial
resources were devoted to such a local affair.
89 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6701–6771 (2012).
90 Accordingly, the context presents no issue of commandeering. Cf. Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (prohibiting Congress from commandeering state
resources to enforce federal policy); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(same).
91 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2092–93 (2014).
92 See id. at 2085 (indicating that the chemicals were available for purchase on
Amazon.com).
93 Id. at 2093.
94 Id. at 2091.
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One might respond that Congress generally wishes to delegate broad
discretion to federal prosecutors and to trust the good judgment of these
actors not to abuse this authority.  The facts of the Bond case might indicate
that prosecutorial abuse occurs, but not that there exists a systemic problem
for which a general judicial response is needed.  Tolerating the occasional
bad outcome is simply the price of supplying prosecutors with sufficient dis-
cretion to deal with uncertain future events.
This argument, however, can be flipped.  It is not clear that the chemical
weapons regime, or any related federal regulatory scheme, is undermined by
a lack of broad prosecutorial discretion.  Given the gravity of criminal law, we
might manage uncertainty by forgoing prosecution rather than tolerating dis-
proportionate punishment.
In federal criminal law cases generally, the modern Supreme Court
intermittently pushes back against the use of capacious or ambiguous statu-
tory language to justify broad prosecutorial discretion.95  Legislative reversal
of these decisions, although not unheard of, is rare.96  Admittedly, Congress
has not responded generally by adopting more precise statutory language to
limit the federalization of criminal law.  But neither has it expressed broad
dissatisfaction with judicial reductions of prosecutorial discretion in this
field.
One can extend this argument to some of the other presumptions
embraced by the modern Court.  The common factor that links Bond, the
presumption against extraterritoriality (Kiobel), the presumption against vio-
lating international law (Charming Betsy), and the presumption against testing
constitutional limits (Catholic Bishop) is encroachment on other forms of sov-
ereignty that compete with congressional authority. Bond involves state com-
petence, Kiobel involves the competence of other nations, and Charming Betsy
involves the prerogatives of the international community.  The Catholic Bishop
presumption involves constitutional interpretation, an area where the judici-
ary generally, and the Court in particular, exercises supreme power.  Attribut-
ing to Congress an inclination to avoid conflicts with these competing
sovereigns, even where the constitutional rule would allow Congress to pre-
vail, seems a plausible majoritarian default based on a reasonable assumption
about the legislature’s preferences.
The one instance where the majoritarian argument does not apply is the
presumption against implied causes of actions.  The issue in these cases is not
which sovereign should be regarded as the default decisionmaker, but rather
95 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015); id. at 1089 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (2013); Skill-
ing v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
But see Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (invoking prosecutorial discre-
tion as argument for supporting the extension of federal criminal law to evasion of foreign
revenue laws).
96 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012)) (overturning McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
360 (1987)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 31 11-MAY-15 14:00
2015] B O N D &  information-forcing  defaults 1495
which actors should have the capacity to enforce a concededly applicable
statutory rule.  The question is one of remedies, not of prescriptive
jurisdiction.
One could argue, however, that the modern presumption rests on a
defensible nonmajoritarian penal default.  The defect in the legislative pro-
cess to which it responds is not powerlessness, but rather interest group con-
testation and an evident preference of Congress to avoid accountability for
the choices it makes.  Adoption of a substantive rule while excluding private
enforcement frustrates lawyers who derive rents from private suits.  Plaintiffs’
attorneys lose an opportunity to make money, and defense attorneys face
reduced demand for their services.  Embracing private enforcement rewards
that group at the expense of the regulated, who may regard private litigation
as a costly and somewhat random regulatory instrument.  Congress might
prefer to remain at peace with both groups by shifting responsibility for the
key decision to a largely unaccountable decisionmaker.
Powell said something like this in his Cannon dissent.  Where Congress
faces competing claims by reasonably well-defined interest groups that do not
implicate downstream information, the judiciary might abstain from making
the choices that Congress ducked.  The courts may treat the pre-enactment
status quo as the default outcome so as to induce Congress to assume respon-
sibility for its actions.
The case for invoking a penal default in these circumstances rests on an
argument about the optimality of electoral accountability.  Legislators might
prefer to avoid having to answer to electors and instead would like to
entrench incumbency, but this preference, perhaps that of the majority of
legislators, does not serve the public interest.  Courts might hold the legisla-
ture’s metaphorical feet to the fire to resist, to use Powell’s term, legislative
shirking.97  Rather than asking which outcome Congress might prefer most
of the time, the judiciary might choose the rule that minimizes the effect of
the enacted legislation.  Enactments that reflect shirking might deserve less
respect, and be given less of an impact on the status quo, than legislation that
facilitates legislative accountability.
One might object that the penal default argument substitutes judicial
preferences for those expressed by legislators.98  If legislators want to avoid
accountability to electors, who are federal judges, the beneficiaries of Article
III protection from accountability, to obstruct them?  This argument, how-
ever, confuses substantive preferences with structural insights.  The view that
legislators should face electoral accountability, and that judicial interpreta-
tions should facilitate this process, is transubstantive.  Rather, it rests on a
conception of the proper roles of legislators and judges in a democratic
republic.  The judiciary can object to shirking without having any views about
the content of the product of Congress’s evasive conduct.
97 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
98 See ELHAUGE, supra note 64, at 23–29; Elhauge, supra note 88, at 44–48.
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To summarize, under certain plausible assumptions about legislative and
judicial motivation and the nature of the dynamic interactions between the
legislature and the judiciary, the Bond presumption is defensible.  Contract
theory asserts that, in the absence of externalities, courts should respond to
ambiguous legal language with a majoritarian default.  An information-forc-
ing default that presumes no encroachment on the prosecutorial discretion
of local officials seems to be a reasonable guess about what Congress prefers.
That this is a majoritarian default, rather than a true penal default, does not
mean it is a bad outcome.  Indeed, majoritarian defaults require fewer
assumptions and thus are easier to defend in the context of legislative inter-
pretation than are punitive defaults.  Similar arguments support Kiobel,
Charming Betsy, and Catholic Bishop.  The presumption against implied causes
of action, by contrast, illustrates how a penal default analysis might justify the
Court’s modern jurisprudence even where a majoritarian default analysis
does not.
The operative word, of course, is “might.”  The analytics borrowed from
contract theory help us to understand particular outcomes, but do not serve
as a proof of the outcome’s desirability.  The underlying questions remain
empirical.  What the analysis does is expose the assumptions on which the
outcomes rest and invite the testing of those assumptions through investiga-
tion of the world in which they function.
In sum, contract theory helps us think about statutory interpretive pre-
sumptions.  It focuses our intention on what Congress knows, and what an
enacting majority of legislators prefers.  It links statutory interpretive pre-
sumptions to problems of information management, both in the legislative
process and in downstream judicial applications.  Contract theory does not
force normative outcomes, but rather directs us to ask the right questions.
CONCLUSION
Bond’s failure to address the constitutionality of treaty-enforcing legisla-
tion no doubt disappointed many foreign relations scholars.  Constitutional
law has broad popular appeal, both within and outside the legal profession.
By refusing to resolve the constitutional issue, Bond denied foreign relations
law a moment in the sun.
All the same, specialists in the law of statutory interpretation, perhaps a
drabber group, should love the case. Bond gave birth to a new statutory inter-
pretive presumption.  It thus offers a window into the Court’s methods for
creating such presumptions and invites reflection on the purposes of, and
the justifications for, these devices.
Contract theory offers an attractive analytic approach for considering
these problems.  It provides a powerful, even compelling, account of private
transactions.  Translating its insights to public transactions is not straightfor-
ward, but neither is it impossible.  On balance, it identifies a set of arguments
that can justify Bond as well as the modern Court’s general approach to
presumptions.
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For someone with particular normative commitments, of course, the
analysis is unhelpful.  If one regards federalism as atavistic and the modern
Court’s federalist decisions as simply an effort to obstruct progressive legisla-
tion, then Bond is, if not a disaster, at least regrettable.  If one divides the
world into categories of liberal and conservative and regards one as funda-
mentally good and the other as largely bad, contract theory and its insights
will seem at least irrelevant, if not a pernicious effort to disguise the insidious
nature of the Court’s jurisprudence.  To the extent such commitments are
inflexible, rather than open to contestation and inquiry, those who have
them may safely ignore this Article.
If, however, one wishes to achieve a broader understanding of federal
statutory interpretation in general and the modern jurisprudence of statu-
tory presumptions in particular, contract theory can help.  It is both theoreti-
cally rigorous and, within the field of private contracting, well validated
empirically.  It provides a clear account of what these presumptions do and
illuminates the empirical conditions under which the Court’s modern
approach makes the world a better place.  It can help everyone—judges,
practitioners, and scholars—understand statutory presumptions and antici-
pate the kinds of evidence that is needed to either extend or limit their
effect.
All this might seem like a lot to take away from a case that rested at
bottom on the culpability of an aggrieved romantic rival whose pathway to
revenge involved troubling, but ultimately not dangerous, conduct.  But the
pettiness of the dispute in a way is the point of the case.  It is difficult to see
why federal prosecutors brought such serious charges against Bond.  Con-
fronted with what seemed to be a clear case of prosecutorial abuse, the Court
responded not on the facts, but with a general principle of law.  The general
principle it invoked fits within a general pattern of doctrine.  Contract theory
indicates that this doctrine, under certain plausible assumptions about legis-
lative and judicial competence, may be desirable.  At the end of the day, this
kind of problem solving by the Court may do more for the general welfare
than any of its grand constitutional pronouncements.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 34 11-MAY-15 14:00
1498 notre dame law review [vol. 90:4
